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1 Introduction
Benoit and Krishna (1984) proved a finite-horizon perfect folk theorem under two suffi-
cient conditions on the stage-game. The first condition is the full-dimensionality defined
in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). A stage-game meets the full-dimensionality condition
if the dimension of the set of feasible payoff vectors equals the number of players. The
second condition of Benoit and Krishna (1984) is that each player receives at least two
distinct payoffs at stage-game Nash equilibria. Smith (1995) generalized the result of
Benoit and Krishna (1984) and provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the
finite-horizon perfect folk theorem. Smith’s condition is that the stage-game has recur-
sively distinct Nash payoffs. This basically means that there exists a time horizon T such
that each player receives at least two distinct payoffs at subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the T -fold repeated game.
In the proof of this result, and under the assumption that the stage-game has recur-
sively distinct Nash payoffs, Smith constructed a family of five-phase strategy profiles to
approximate feasible payoff vectors that dominate the effective minimax payoff vector of
the stage-game. These strategy profiles are not subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
finitely repeated game. I illustrate this fact with a counter-example. However, the char-
acterization of attainable payoff vectors by Smith remains true. I provide an alternative
proof.
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a counter-example and discusses
the failure of Smith’s (1995) proof. Section 3 recalls the model and formally states the
finite-horizon perfect folk theorem of Smith (1995) and Section 4 provides an alternative
proof the later result.
2 The counter-example
2.1 The stage-game
Consider the three-player stage-game G whose payoff matrix is given in Table 1. In the
game G, player 1 chooses lines (a11 or a
2
1), player 2 chooses columns (a
1
2 or a
2
2) and player
3 chooses matrices (a13 or a
2
3).
The pure action profiles (a21, a
1
2, a
2
3) and (a
1
1, a
2
2, a
2
3) are Nash equilibria of the stage-
game G and each player receives distinct payoffs at those action profiles. Therefore, this
game has recursively distinct Nash payoffs, see Definition 1. Players 1 and 2 have the
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a13 a
2
3
a12 a
2
2
a11 0 0 0 2 2 0
a21 0 0 0 1 1 0
a12 a
2
2
2 2 2 3 3 3
2 2 1 2 2 2
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the stage-game G.
same utility function and are therefore equivalent.3 The pure effective minimax payoff
of player 1 (respectively player 2) equals 1 and is uniquely provided by the action profile
w1 = w2 = (a21, a
2
2, a
1
3).
4
The payoff vector u = (3
2
, 3
2
, 3
2
) is feasible and strictly dominates the effective mini-
max payoff vector µ˜ = (1, 1, 1). The payoff vector u is therefore approachable by means
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the finitely-repeated game with discounting; see
Theorem 1.
In the proof of Theorem 1 of Smith (1995) which is stated in page 9 of this note, to
approach the feasible payoff vector u, the author uses a five-phase strategy. I recall it
below and show that it is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium profile.
2.2 The five-phase strategy of Smith
The strategy profile used by Smith (1995) employs the concept of payoff asymmetry
family that I briefly recall below.
2.2.1 The payoff asymmetry family
The concept of payoff asymmetry family is introduced by Abreu et al. (1994). Such a
family allows to suitably reward effective punishers after a punishment phase. In our
example, the payoff vectors x1 = x2 = (1.3, 1.3, 1.3) and x3 = (1.4, 1.4, 1.2) form a payoff
asymmetry family relatively to u. Indeed, the payoff family {x1, x2, x3} meets the fol-
lowing requirements:
(A1) xi >> µ˜ for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, [strict individually rationality]
3Player i is equivalent to player j in the game G if the utility function of player i is a positive affine
transformation of the utility function of player j.
4The mixed effective minimax payoff of both players 1 and 2 also equals 1 and is uniquely provided
by the pure action profile w1.
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(A2) xii < ui for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, [target payoff domination]
and
(A3′) xii < x
j
i for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i  j.5 [payoff asymmetry]
I should notice that (A3′) is an adjusted version of the original requirement (3) in
Abreu et al. (1994) where the game meets the NEU (non-equivalent utility) property.
2.2.2 Length of phases
Let βi be the best payoff vector of player i in the game G.
Let ωi be worst payoff vector of player i in the game G.
Choose q such that for all i, ωii + qx
i
i > β
i
i + 1. Take q = 4.
Given q, choose r such that for all j with j  i,
qωjj + rx
i
j > β
j
j + rx
j
j + (q − 1)uj + 1. Take r = 86.
Take th(q + r) = 3(q + r).
2.2.3 Smith’s strategy
Let a be the outcome of a public randomization device that has an average payoff of
u = (3
2
, 3
2
, 3
2
).
Let T ≥ th(r + q) and σ be the strategy profile of the finitely-repeated game G(T )
described by the following five phases.
1. MAIN PATH: Play a until period T − th(r + q). [If any player i deviates early,
start 3; if some player deviates late, start 5.6]
2. GOOD RECURSIVE PHASE: Play the stage-game Nash equilibrium profile
(a11, a
2
2, a
2
3) till the end of the finitely-repeated game G(T ).
5The notation i  j means that player i is not equivalent to player j in the game G.
6A deviation is called late if it occurs during the final q+ r+ th(r+ q) periods of the repeated game;
all others are called early deviations.
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3. MINIMAX PHASE: Play wi for q periods. [If player j (with j  i) deviates, start
4.] Set j ← i.
4. REWARD PHASE: Play xj for r periods. [ If i deviates early, restart 3; if some
player deviates late, start 5.]
5. BAD RECURSIVE NASH PHASE: Play the stage-game Nash equilibrium (a21, a
1
2, a
2
3)
until the end of the game.
2.2.4 A profitable deviation from σ
For all k ≥ 0, let T (k) = k + r + q + th(r + q). Let σ′1 be a strategy of player 1 in
which player 1 deviates from a in the first period of the repeated game as well as at
the beginning of each REWARD PHASE and plays her stage-game best response in
each period of the MINIMAX PHASE. This deviation is profitable for large k. In-
deed, if player 1 does not deviate from σ, she gets at most an expected payoff of
A(k) = 1
T (k)
{β1 + 3(k+r+q−1)
2
+ 3th(r + q)}.
If she deviates and plays σ′1, she gets at least B(k) =
1
T (k)
{2(k − dk−1
q+1
e − 2)} where
dk−1
q+1
e is the smallest integer greater than or equal to k−1
q+1
.
As k goes to ∞, A(k) goes to 3
2
and B(k) goes to 8
5
.
This means that for sufficiently long time horizon T and sufficiently high discount
factor δ, the strategy profile σ is not a Nash equilibrium of the finitely-repeated game
G(δ, T ) and therefore not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G(δ, T ).
2.3 Intuition behind the failure of Smith’s proof
Denote by wi the profile of stage-game mixed actions at which player i receives her ef-
fective minimax payoff.7
If the utility function of player i in the stage-game G is equivalent to that of another
player, say player j, then the effective minimax payoff of player i might be strictly greater
than her minimax payoff and player i might even have a strict incentive to deviate from
7The strategy profile defined in page 12 has a slightly different interpretation. Indeed at that profile,
a player whose utility function is equivalent to that of player i might have incentive to deviate. If she
does so, she receives at most her stage-game effective minimax payoff.
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wi. Indeed, it might be the case that only player j plays a stage-game best response at
the profile wi. In that case, it is not convenient to use the five-phase strategy profile of
Smith (1995) to approximate a payoff vector in which player i receives strictly less than
her best response payoff at wi.
Indeed, during the third phase of the five-phase strategy of Smith (1995), player i is
minimaxed using the stage-game action profile wi where she might not be at a stage-
game best response. In addition, during this phase, deviations by any player who is
equivalent to player i (including player i) are ignored. As in the counter-example above,
player i might find it profitable to deviate from an ongoing path (either from the MAIN
PATH or from the REWARD PHASE) to push her fellow players to start the MINIMAX
PHASE where she is punished.
This failure of is not minor in the sense that for any specification of the action profile
to be used in the MINIMAX PHASE where i = 1, at least one player will find it strictly
profitable to deviate from the five-phase strategy of Smith (1995).
Denote a MINIMAX PHASE where i = 1 by MP(1).
Indeed, if for a given specification w1 of the stage-game profile to be repeatedly played
in the phase MP(1) the strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
finitely-repeated game G(T ), then at w1 player 3 has to play a13 with strictly positive
probability. Otherwise the punishment payoff of player 1 in the minimax phase MP(1)
will be strictly greater than player 1’s entry in the target payoff vector u = (3
2
, 3
2
, 3
2
).
Given the choice of player 3 in w1, player 2 has to play a22 with probability 1 at the
profile w1. Otherwise she will find it strictly profitable to deviate from σ and repeatedly
play her best response at w1 during the phase MP(1), as she will not be punished if she
does so. Given that player 2 plays a22 with probability 1 in the profile w
1, player 1 has to
play a11 with probability 1 in the profile w
1. Otherwise she will find it strictly profitable
to deviate and to play a11 with probability 1 in each round of the phase MP(1). There-
fore, only convex sums of payoff vectors (2, 2, 0) and (3, 3, 3) are possible payoff to the
profile of actions w1. This implies that player 1 receives an average payoff greater than or
equal to 2 in each round of the minimax phase MP(1), which is strictly greater than her
entry in the target equilibrium payoff u. This contrasts the idea of punishment behind
a minimax phase, which is to deter deviations. A player should not find it profitable to
start a minimax phase.
The above reasoning teaches that the incentives of any player who is not at her stage-
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game best response at the profile w1 have to be controlled during a minimax phase. Note
that this reasoning is not possible in case the stage-game meets the NEU (non-equivalent
utility) property of Abreu et al. (1994) or the full dimensionality property of Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986). Under those conditions, no player is equivalent to another and
therefore any stage-game profile at which player i plays a stage-game best response and
receives her minimax payoff is suitable for a minimax phase, see Benoit and Krishna
(1984) and Smith (1993) for the finite-horizon perfect folk theorem under those proper-
ties.
The methods of Benoit and Krishna (1984) and Smith (1993) do not easily extend to
games where some players have equivalent utility functions. But still, the finite-horizon
perfect folk theorem for games that possibly violate the NEU condition as stated in
Smith (1995) holds. This note provides a clear proof.
In the next section I recall Smith (1995)’s model and state his finite-horizon perfect
folk theorem. I provide the proof of the latter theorem in Section 4.
3 Smith’s model
3.1 The stage-game
Let G = 〈Ai, pii; i = 1, ..., n〉 be a finite normal form n-player game, where Ai is player
i’s finite set of actions, and pii : A = ×ni=1Ai → R is player i’s utility function. Let Mi
be player i’s mixed action set and let M = ×ni=1Mi. For any profile of actions a ∈ A,
set pi(a) = (pi1(a), . . . , pin(a)). For any profile of mixed actions µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ M ,
denote by pi(µ) = (pi1(µ), . . . , pin(µ)) the vector of expected payoffs of players.
Let J = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. Let J (i) be the set of players whose utility
function is a positive affine transformation of pii. Let
µ˜i = minµ∈M maxj∈J (i) maxµ′j pii(µ
′
j, µ−j)
be the effective minimax payoff of player i. Normalize the utilities functions of players
such that µ˜i = 0 for all i. Let F = co{pi(µ) : µ ∈ M} be convex hull of the set of
expected payoff vectors. Let F ∗ = {u ∈ F : ui > 0, for all i} be the feasible and strictly
rational set.
Given a subset of players J ′ = {j1, . . . , jm} ⊂ J and their mixed actions profile
aJ ′ = (aj1 , . . . , ajm) ∈Mj1 ×Mj2 × · · · ×Mjm ≡MJ ′ , (1)
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let G(aJ ′) be the induced (n−m)−player game for players J \J ′ obtained from G when
the actions of players J ′ are fixed to aJ ′ .
Define a Nash decomposition of the game G as an increasing sequence of h ≥ 0
nonempty subset of players from J , namely
{∅ = J0 ( J1 ( · · · ( Jh ⊆ J}, (2)
so that for g = 1, . . . , h, actions eJg−1 , fJg−1 ∈ MJg−1 exist with a pair of Nash payoff
vectors y(eJg−1) of G(eJg−1) and y(fJg−1) of G(fJg−1) different exactly for players in
Jg\Jg−1, ie
y(eJg−1)i 6= y(fJg−1)i (3)
for all i ∈ Jg\Jg−1.
Definition 1 The game G has recursively distinct Nash payoffs if there is a Nash de-
composition with Jh = J .
3.2 The finitely-repeated game
Let G(δ, T ) be the T−fold repeated game in which players discount the futur with the
parameter δ < 1. Smith (1995) assumed that the monitoring structure is perfect so that
each player can condition her current action on the past actions of all players.
A strategy behavioral strategy of player i in the repeated game G(δ, T ) is a T−tuple
αi = (αi1, . . . , αi,T ) where for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and past history ht ∈ At−1 (with A0 = ∅),
αit(h
t) is the (possibly mixed) action that player i intends to play at time t if she observes
ht. The objective function of player i in the finitely-repeated game G(δ, T ) is the expected
discounted sum of her stage-game payoffs:
piδiT (α) :=
1−δ
1−δT
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1piit(α)
where piit(α) is player i
′s expected payoff at period t with the strategy profile α =
(α1, . . . , αn). The strategy profile α is a Nash equilibrium of the finitely-repeated game
G(δ, T ) if for all player i, αi maximizes the objective function pi
δ
iT (·, α−i) of player i.
The strategy profile α is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely-repeated
game G(δ, T ) if after any history ht, the restriction α|ht of α to the history ht is a Nash
equilibrium of the remaining game.
Let
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V (δ, T ) = {piδT (α) = (piδ1T (α), · · · , piδnT (α)) | α is a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G(δ, T )}
be the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely-repeated
game G(δ, T ).
Theorem 1 (See Smith (1995)) Suppose that the stage-game G has recursively dis-
tinct Nash payoffs. Then for the finitely-repeated game G(δ, T ), ∀u ∈ F ∗ and ∀ε > 0,
∃T0 <∞ and δ0 < 1 so that T ≥ T0 and δ ∈ [δ0, 1] ⇒ ∃v ∈ V (δ, T ) with ‖u− v‖ < ε.
4 A proof of Smith’s folk theorem
I follow Smith (1995) and assume that players condition their choices on the outcome of
a publicly observed exogenous continuous random variable. For simplicity, I also assume
that the discount factor equals 1. The later assumption is without loss of generality as
it does not change the incentives of players if those are strict.
The main ingredient of the proof of Theorem 1 is a multi-level reward path function
whose existence is guaranteed by the recursively distinct Nash payoffs condition, see
Lemma 1. The multi-level reward path function allows to independently leverage the
behavior of players near the end of the finitely-repeated game, no matter if there are
or not players who have equivalent utility functions. In addition, and backwardly, this
multi-level reward path function allows to leverage the behavior of players at any stage
of the finitely-repeated game.
Gossner (1995) used similar method to prove a finite-horizon perfect folk theorem with
unobservable mixed strategies. The advantage of Lemma 1 is that it does not require
the dimension of the set of feasible payoff vectors to equal the number of players nei-
ther each player to have at least two distinct payoffs at Nash equilibria of the stage-game.
Denote by G(T ) the T -fold finitely repeated game G(δ, T ) where the discount factor
δ equals 1. In the game G(T ), the utility of player i at the behavioral strategy α is
piTi (α) := limδ→1 pi
δ
iT (α)
which is equal to the payoff average 1
T
∑T
t=1 piiT (α). Let
V (1, T ) := {piT (α) = (piT1 (α), · · · , piTn (α)) | α is a SPNE of G(T )}
be the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated
game G(T ) and let
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AP = {u ∈ F | ∀ε > 0,∃T0 <∞ so that T ≥ T0 ⇒ ∃v ∈ V (1, T ) with ‖u− v‖ < ε}
be the set of feasible payoff vectors that are approachable by means of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of finite repetitions of the stage-game G. To prove Theorem 1, we will
show that F ∗ ⊆ AP .
Lemma 1 Suppose that the stage-game G has recursively distinct Nash payoffs. Then
there exists φ > 0 such that for all p ≥ 0, there exists rp > 0 and
θp : {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)} →M rp := M × · · · ×M
such that for all γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}, θp(γ) is a play path generated by a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game G(rp). Furthermore, for all i ∈ N ,
γ, γ′ ∈ {0, 1}n we have
pi
rp
i [θ
p(1, γ−i)]− pirpi [θp(0, γ−i)] ≥ φ (4)
pi
rp
i [θ
p(γ)]− pirpi [θp(−1, · · · ,−1)] ≥ φ (5)
|pirpi [θp(γ)]− pirpi [θp(γJ (i) , γ′J\J (i))]| <
1
2p
. (6)
This lemma says that, if the stage-game G has recursively distinct Nash payoffs, then
we can (almost-) independently leverage the behavior of each player near the end of the
game. This lemma also allows to construct credible punishment schemes and to approx-
imate any feasible payoff vector that dominates the effective minimax payoff vector by
means of SPNE of the finitely repeated game.
Assume that the finitely repeated game will last with a reward phase where players
are rewarded with respect to their behavior in the earlier stage of the repeated game,
that players are informed that the reward path to be used is a SPNE path θp(γ) of the
repeated game G(rp). Furthermore, assume that γ is initialized to the value (1, · · · , 1)
and that each player has the possibility to update her entry in the vector γ each time
where a player whose utility function is not equivalent to her deviates. Inequality (4)
says that, given the profile γ−i of players of the block J \{i}, player i strictly prefers the
path θp(1, γ−i) to the path θp(0, γ−i). Inequality (6) ensures that the incentives of play-
ers of different equivalence classes are almost independent for sufficiently large p. The
strategy constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 does not allow a player to strategically
improve her payoff by giving to players whose utilities’ function are equivalent to her a
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chance to update their entries in the vector γ.
Consider for instance the stage-game whose payoff matrix is given by Table 1. In that
game, player 1 and player 2 have the same utility function and are therefore equivalent.
Figure 3 below displays the relative position of the payoff vectors pirp [θp(γ)] where γ ∈
{0, 1}3 ∪ {(−1,−1,−1). The path θp(−1,−1,−1) will allow to deter deviations that
occurs near the end of the game.
: Relative open ball with radius 1
2p
and centre θ(γ)
player 3
p
la
ye
rs
1,
2
ﬀ pirp [θp(−1,−1,−1)]
ﬀ pirp [θp(0, 0, 1)]
ﬀ pirp [θp(0, 1, 1)] = pirp [θp(1, 0, 1)]
ﬀ pirp [θp(1, 1, 1)]
-pirp [θp(1, 1, 0)]
-pirp [θp(1, 0, 0)] = pirp [θp(0, 1, 0)]
-pirp [θp(0, 0, 0)]
Figure 3: An example of relative position of the payoff vectors pirp [θp(γ)].
A detailed proof of Lemma 1 is presented in Section 5.
Proof of Smith (1995)’s folk theorem.
Let u be a feasible payoff vector that lies in the relative interior of F ∗, and let a be the
outcome of a public randomization device that has an expected payoff vector of u.
Obtain φ, r1 and θ
1 with p = 1 from the Lemma 1. Let q1 > 0 and q2 > 0 such that
0 < q1pii(w
i) + q2r1pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] < q1 + q2r1
2
ui (7)
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and
−2ρ+ q1
2
ui > 0 for all i ∈ N. (8)
Given q1, q2 and r1, choose r such that
−2(q1 + q2r1)ρ+ rφ > 0. (9)
Given q1 q2, r1 and r, choose p0 > 0 such that
q2r1
2
ui − r
2p0
> ui − r
2p0
> 0 (10)
Apply the Lemma 1 to p0 and obtain rp0 and θ
p0 . Update q1 ← rp0q1; q2 ← rp0q2r1; r ←
rp0r. The quantities φ, θ
1, q1, q2, r, r1 and θ
p0 are such that
0 < q1pii(w
i) + q2pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] < q1 + q2
2
ui (11)
−2(q1 + q2)ρ+ rφ > 0 (12)
−2ρ+ q1 + q2
2
ui − r
2p0
> 0 (13)
and
ui − r
2p0
> 0 for all i ∈ N. (14)
The T−period equilibrium outcome sequence is
a, . . . , a; θp0(1, · · · , 1)
where a is played for T − r periods and the path θp0(1, · · · , 1) is of length r.
Now I describe the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium σ of the finitely-repeated game
that supports the equilibrium path. For all i ∈ J , let wi be a stage-game action profile
such that
maxj∈J (i) maxmj∈Mj ui(mj, w
i
−j) = 0.
At the action profile wi, no player of the block J (i) has to be at a best response. Playing
a best response to the action profile wi, a player of the block J (i) receives at most her
effective minimax payoff.
Set γ = (1, · · · , 1). From now on, call a deviation late if it occurs during the final
q1+q2+r periods of the finitely-repeated gameG(T ); all others are called early deviations.
The strategy profile σ involves 5 phases and can be graphed as follows:
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2
1
3
45
Early deviation
Late deviation
La
te
de
vi
at
io
n
Early
deviation
N
orm
al
p
ath
N
orm
al
p
ath
N
or
m
al
pa
th Norm
al path
q1 periods at most q1 + q2
periods
q2 periods
rp0 periods
1. MAIN PATH: Play a until period T − r. [If any player i deviates early, start 2; if
some player deviates late, start 3.] Go to 4.
2. MINIMAX PHASE P (i): During this phase, each player j ∈ J (i) has to play her
action wij while each player of the block N\J (i) can play whatever action she wants.
This phase last for q1 periods. [If any player j ∈ J (i) deviates early, restart 2.; if any
player j ∈ J (i) deviates late, start 3.]
At the end of this phase, for all player j /∈ J (i), set γj = 0 if there is at least one period
of the MINIMAX PHASE where player j played an action different to wij and set γj = 1
otherwise. Go to 5.
3. LATE DEVIATION: Each player can play whatever action she want till period
T − r. At period T − r, set γ = (−1, · · · ,−1). Go to 4.
4. END OF THE GAME: Follow r
rp0
times a SPNE that supports the equilibrium
path θp0(γ).
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5. SPE PHASE: Follow q2
r1
times the SPNE of the game G(r1) whose play path is
θ1(1, · · · , 1). Go back to 1.
For sufficiently large time horizon T , the strategy profile σ is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(T )
In the following, call a player j /∈ J (i) effective punisher if γj = 1 at the end of the
MINIMAX PHASE P (i). I prove the following:
A) It is strictly dominant for any player j /∈ J (i) to be effective punisher during a
MINIMAX PHASE P (i)
B) No early deviation from the MINIMAX PHASE is profitable
C) No early deviation from the MAIN PATH is profitable
D) No late deviation is profitable
A) It is strictly dominant to be effective punisher during a MINIMAX
PHASE
If player j /∈ J (i) is effective punisher, she receives at least:
1. −(q1 + q2)ρ during the MINIMAX PHASE and the SPE PHASE;
2. some payoff Uj till period T − r;
3. r · pirp0i [θp0(1, γ−j)] in the last r periods of the repeated game.
In total she receives at least −(q1 + q2)ρ+ Uj + r · pirp0i [θp0(1, γ−j)].
If player j is not effective punisher, she receives at most:
1. (q1 + q2)ρ during the MINIMAX PHASE and the SPE PHASE;
2. the same payoff Uj till period T − r;
3. r · pirp0i [θp0(0, γ−j)] in the last r periods of the repeated game.
In total (q1 + q2)ρ + Uj + r · pirp0i [θp0(0, γ−j)] which is less than or equal to (q1 + q2)ρ +
Uj + r · pirp0i [θp0(1, γ−j)]− rφ, see inequality (4). As −2(q1 + q2)ρ+ rφ > 0, it is strictly
dominant for any player j /∈ J (i) to be effective punisher.
B) No early deviation from the MINIMAX PHASE is profitable
If player i ∈ J (i) deviates early from the MINIMAX PHASE, she receives at most:
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1. 0 in the deviation period;
2. q1pii(w
i)+q2pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the new MINIMAX PHASE and the following SPE
PHASE;
3. some payoff Ui till the end of the game.
If player i does not deviates, she receives at least:
1. q1pii(w
i) + q2pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] + ui till the end of the SPE PHASE;
2. the payoff Ui − r2p0 till the end of the game.
As ui − r2p0 > 0, no early deviation from the MINIMAX PHASE is profitable.
C) No early deviation from the MAIN PATH is profitable
If player i deviates early from the MAIN PATH, she receives at most:
1. ρ in the deviation period;
2. q1pii(w
i) + q2pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the MINIMAX PHASE and the SPE PHASE;
3. some payoff Ui till period T − r;
4. r · pirp0i [θp0(γJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)] in phase 4.
In total ρ+q1pii(w
i)+q2pi
r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)]+Ui+r ·pirp0i [θp0(γJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)] which is strictly
less than ρ+ q1+q2
2
ui + Ui + r · pirp0i [θp0(γJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)], see inequality (11).
If player i does not deviates, she receives at least:
1. −ρ+ (q1 + q2) · ui till the end of the SPE PHASE;
2. the same payoff Ui till period T − r;
3. r · pirp0i [θp0(γ)] in phase 4.
In total −ρ+ (q1 + q2) · ui +Ui + r · pirp0i [θp0(γ)] which is strictly greater than −ρ+ (q1 +
q2) · ui + Ui + r · pirp0i [θp0(γJ (i) , 1, · · · , 1)]− r2p0 , see inequality (6).
As −2ρ+ q1+q2
2
ui − r2p0 > 0, no early deviation from the MAIN PATH is profitable.
D) No late deviation is profitable
If from an ongoing path (MAIN PATH or MINIMAX PHASE) player i deviates late,
then she receives at most:
1. (q1 + q2)ρ till the beginning of the END OF THE GAME;
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2. r · pirp0i [θp0(−1, · · · ,−1)] in the END OF THE GAME.
If player i does not deviate, she receives at least:
1. −(q1 + q2)ρ till the beginning of the END OF THE GAME;
2. r · pirp0i [θp0(γ)] in the END OF THE GAME, where γ ∈ {0, 1}n.
As r ·pirp0i [θp0(γ)] ≥ r ·pirp0i [θp0(−1, · · · ,−1)] + rφ and rφ > 2(q1 + q2)ρ, no late deviation
is profitable. This concludes the proof.
5 Proof of intermediate results
In this section I proceed to the proof of Lemma 1. I first show that under the recursively
distinct Nash payoffs condition, each player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs,
which is necessary for the construction of our multi-level reward path function.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the stage-game G has recursively distinct Nash payoffs. Then
there exists T0 > 0 such that for all T > T0, each player receives at least two distinct
payoffs at SPNE of G(T ).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let {∅ = J0 ( J1 ( · · · ( Jh = J } be the Nash decomposition of G.
I show by induction that for all l ≤ h there exists T0,l > 0 such that each player of Jl
receives distinct payoffs at SPNE of G(T ) for all T > T0,l.
Players of the block J1 receive distinct payoffs at Nash equilibria of G. Therefore, the
property holds for l = 1. Let l < h such that T0,l exists. Let i ∈ Jl+1\Jl, and let µ
be a Nash equilibrium profile of G(µJl) in which player i receives a payoff that is dif-
ferent to her unique stage-game Nash equilibrium payoff. Let η1 and η2 be two SPNE
play paths of G(T0,l + 1) where each player of Jl receives distinct payoffs. The path
ηi = (µ, η1, η2 · · · , η1, η2) is a SPNE play path. At ηi, player i receives a payoff that is
different to her stage-game Nash equilibrium payoff which is also a SPNE payoff. The
conjunction lemma (see Benoit and Krishna (1984)) guarantee the existence of T0,l+1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The set AP is non-empty and convex and therefore has a relative interior point x. Let
φ > 0 such that the relative ball B˜(x, 5φn) is included in AP . For all γ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n
and j ∈ J , let
θj(γ) = xj − φ|J (j)|+ 3φ
∑
j′∈J (j) γj′
and
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θ(γ) = (θ1(γ), · · · , θn(γ)).
For all γ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
θi(1, γ−i)− θi(0, γ−i) = 3φ;
θi(γ)− θi(−1, · · · ,−1) ≥ 3φ
and
‖θ(γ)− x‖ < 5nφ.
Furthermore, since each player receives distinct payoffs within the set AP and players
within the same equivalence class J (i) have equal entry at the payoff vector θ(γ), we
have that
θ(γ) ∈ B˜(x, 5φn) ⊆ AP .8
Let p ≥ 0 and ε = 1
2
min{φ, 1
2p
}. For each γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}, there exists
T0γp <∞ so that for all T ≥ T0γp, there exists αγp a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the repeated game G(T ) such that ‖piT (αγp)− θ(γ)‖ < ε.
Take rp = max{T0γp | γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}}. For all γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪
{(−1, · · · ,−1)} and p ≥ 0, let θp(γ) be the SPNE play path generated by the SPNE αγp
of the repeated game G(rp).
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